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IV 
B R O W N I N G  ON LOVE,  MUSIC, AND 
I M M O R T A L I T Y  
ROWNING’S stubborn attachment to his own indi- B viduality, together with his own religious education, 
explains that belief in personal immortality of the soul 
which was largely responsible for his general hold on the 
public. But I find traces in him of another doctrine, much 
more general and vague, and philosophically more easy to  
define, namely, that  nothing which pertains to the life of 
the spirit dies, that  there never will be one good lost, that  
as he says in Abt Yogler: 
which is the same as when he says: 
All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good shall exist,j04 
Hold on, hope hard in the subtle thing zm 
That’s spirit. 
This  is the immortality of the spirit which every idealist 
will accept, but Browning soon left that  track; he became 
more exacting and set out t o  develop with wonderful elo- 
quence a belief deeply rooted in most human hearts, a very 
natural and very touching one, too, namely, that  we shall 
personally survive, that  friends and lovers will meet here- 
af ter ,  that  Evelyn Hope, when she wakens in another world 
will find in her hand the geranium leaf placed there by her 
lover, and remember, and understand. This  is of course 
only an image, and especially so with respect to  the geran- 
ium leaf. Yet, he himself, a widower, thought of Eliza- 
beth in those realms of hope, in the “whiteness” which her 
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face makes proud, in that wanness where her foot may fall, 
and you remember the end of Prospice, 
Then a light, then thy breast,lm 
And with God be the rest! 
0 thou soul of my soull I shall clasp thee again, 
In  this connection, there is a poem of especial interest 
not so much poetical as biographical, a poem where for 
once, rejecting imagination and fancy, discarding religious 
revelation, he means to  argue philosophically for himself 
in his own name. It is that impassioned meditation which 
he wrote under the shock of the sudden death of his friend, 
Miss Egerton-Smith, a t  L a  Saisiaz, the villa in Savoy which 
he had hired with her and his sister. This time, he will 
not dream, he says, but once for all discuss the question: 
does the soul survive the body? I s  there God’s self, no, 
o r  yes? Yet, he is biased and the very way he puts the 
question is fallacious. For the word soul may mean either 
the soul of the world, spirit, or, as Browning takes it, our 
individual soul, and in that case the equation between the 
survival of soul and the existence of God ceases to  be cor- 
rect. H e  will not dream, he says, he will submit to  the 
testimony of fact, for truth is truth. H e  will act as an 
umpire between Reason and Fancy. Yet he does not even 
state the most commonplace objections of Reason, namely, 
that  our person seems to  be bound up with a certain body 
and certain circumstances of time and space; and, more- 
over, that it is difficult to  admit of the immortality of some 
persons who d o  not seem to  have evolved in them any 
divine spark a t  all, who remain for  all their lives what he 
calls “finite and finished clods”, or, as the speaker says in 
A Toccata of Galuppi’s: 
The soul, doubtless, is immortal-where a soul can be discerned.*m 
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So much for  the negative side of Reason. But there is 
another side of the question which he does not see either. 
H e  sets out as if he were going impartially to  examine 
other views than his own, but proves curiously incapable 
of grasping and doing justice to  them. I t  cannot be said 
that he gives a fair recognition, for  instance, to  the idea 
of survival in other people’s minds, of immortality by re- 
membrance. I t  seems that for  him just t o  state that  view 
is to  refute it. Lifting the body of his friend, he exclaims: 
A tribute to yon Bowers and moss,J08 
What of you remains beside? A memory1 
H e  then proceeds, in a perfunctory way, to  describe that  
ii memory” as something very imperfect and fleeting: I 
shall remember you while I live, but I also shall die 
And so both memories dwindle- 108 
that  is all he has to  say, but surely there is morel 
Some persons, perhaps the more so as they do not dare 
to  hope in personal immortality, will practise what I call 
denial of death by remembrance. They will make a shrine 
in their memory to  the saintly image of some beloved 
mother, sister, or friend, of their heroic sufferings, of their 
saintly death, and their own soul may be colored and 
their conduct pervaded by it, and those moments of which 
Wordsworth says : 
Some silent laws our hearts will make,IJo 
Which they shall long obey: 
We for the year to come may take 
Our temper from to-day. 
In  Bernard Shaw’s Saint Joan there is a vulgar soldier 
who thought it great fun to  see a witch being burned, but 
he comes back in tears and cries that  by Joan and not by 
Christ, his soul has been saved: a good instance of the influ- 
ence of personality. And as to  Christ himself, how many 
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thousands of people who do not actually believe in his 
divinity, yet follow or revere his teaching, affording one 
of the most splendid historical instances of survival by 
remembrance, even if they see nothing actually supernatural 
in his life. 
A 
mother may die happy, consoled by the thought of her 
children who live after her. And if we have no children, 
our very acts, if not the thought of us, may be transmitted 
in endless waves, and have incalculable repercussions in the 
life of the world. It is curious that  Browning did not see 
this, and failed to  make the most of his doctrine of personal 
influence so wonderfully set out in Pippa Passes. T h e  idea 
of the play is that  the song of Pippa, by the joy and inno- 
cence i t  breathes, unconsciously influences the lives of four 
groups of people under the windows of whom she passes 
in her round through Asolo. Pippa has brought them, in 
Professor Corson’s words ‘‘new feelings fresh from God”. 
T h e  poet has shown us that  all spirit is mutually attrac- 
tive, that  the humblest life has therefore its value, that  no 
man is great or small in the sight of God, 
H e  consoles us all, ordinary people, for having no genius 
and producing no masterpiece: our lives may yet not be 
useless. H e  goes a step further elsewhere in saying that 
even our intentions count, as much as our acts: 
Le t  us now take the side of the person who dies. 
All service ranks the same with God.Ifi  
All I could never be, l l t  
All, men ignored in me, 
This, I was worth to God, whose wheel the pitcher shaped. 
But it is no longer so in La Saisiaz; it is no longer enough 
for  him to be the well shaped cup that “slakes the Master’s 
thirst”. H e  must be there himself and remember. W e  
find now in the poet a want of self-abnegation which is 
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nai’vely, almost cynically expressed in the lines following 
those we began to  quote : 
And so both memories dwindle, yours and mine together linked,”s 
Till there is but left for comfort, when the last spark proves extinct, 
This-that somewhere new existence led by men and women new 
Possibly attains perfection coveted by me and you. 
H e  says again, and he puts this, mind you, ironically: 
Why repine? There’s ever someone lives although ourselves be dead!”d 
Well, there are those who find rest in this idea, and I 
strongly doubt if they are inferior, if their attitude of mind 
is less religious than that of Browning. 
There  are even those who go further, who say: what if 
humanity, if the world, perishes? There  may be other 
worlds and, above all worlds, there is the Spirit. There  
are those who have learned to  find a solace in the idea 
that not their person, but a part  of them, the best they 
could evolve, may live and be remembered, say, in God. 
There  are others for  whom the supreme goal is a dis- 
appearance of individuality into an unimaginable feeling 
of eternity, of which some of them, like Spinoza, have had 
faint forebodings in this life. Browning has been con- 
gratulated for summarily disposing of the social immor- 
tality of the positivists, but, in La Saisiax, a t  least, he 
fails likewise to  understand the immortality in God. T o  
put it otherwise, Browning to  a certain extent sacrifices to 
the idea of immortality that of eternity. T o  some minds 
it will seem that he encroaches too much on the Unknown 
and that in demanding much, he does, perhaps, not demand 
enough. The re  is some truth in Professor Santayana’s 
saying that “with an unconscious mixture of heathen in- 
stinct with Christian doctrine, he thinks of the other world 
as heaven, but of the life to  be led there as the life of 
Nature”. 
290 Art and Thought of Robert Browning 
This  leads us to  inquire into the motives of Browning’s 
craving for  personal immortality. T h e  chief is, perhaps, 
that  he has such a love of this present life that  he wants 
to  make it last forever. I t  is certain that he pictures 
future life after the image of the present and mainly as a 
continuation of its struggles. In  Fijne,  he speaks of 
eternity, that’s battle without end. 116 
In  Old Pictures in Florence, he says: 
There’s a fancy some lean to and others hate- 116 
That ,  when this life is ended, begins 
New work for the soul in another state, 
Where it strives and gets weary, loses and wins: 
Only the scale’s to be changed, that’s all. 
. . . . . . . . . .  
Browning is evidently among those who “lean to  that 
fancy”. Therefore future life, among other things, is 
conceived as the life where scholars and artists may con- 
tinue to  develop and improve. This was the craving of 
the refined pagan Cleon in the poem so entitled. It is also 
that of Browning in the sequel of the passage of La Saisiax 
already quoted : 
While ourselves, the only witness to what  work our life evolved,ll7 
Only to ourselves proposing problems proper to be solved 
By ourselves alone,-who working ne’er shall know if work bear fruit 
Others reap and garner. 
I have already pointed out that  there is want of self-abne- 
gation in this. I may add  that  this desire for  a life where 
we might end the work begun and see the result of effort, 
looks much like a form of the desire for recompense, 
whereas a virtuous effort  ought to find its recompense in 
itself. 
In  the next place, future life is also for  Browning the 
meeting of those who have loved. This  is clear from the 
occasion on which L a  Saisiaz was written and from the 
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expressed wish to  meet hereafter the “Dear and True”,  
that is to  say, Miss Egerton-Smith herself: 
Only grant my soul may carry high through death her cup unspilled,lla 
Brimming though it be with knowledge. 
Grant  me (once again) assurance we shall each meet each some day.l’e 
I have said that this last wish, however respectable, is not 
insuperable and may be replaced by what I call denial of 
death by remembrance. 
But there is another wish that is, to  my mind, almost 
insuperable, and therefore the most legitimate motive for 
Browning’s hope, I mean the wish to  atone for so much 
innocent suffering in this life. Now, this motive is ex- 
pressly disclaimed for Browning by the Rev. W. Robert- 
son in an important essay on La Saisiac republished 
by the London Browning Society and sometimes requoted by 
the critics. “ I t  is not the injustice of life that aflicts him but 
its unintelligibility.” I say: i f  so, the worse for Brown- 
ing I Our  author explains “unintelligibility” by saying that 
this world is a scene of education and that without immor- 
tality there would be no motive for effort, I have replied 
to this that it looks much like a desire for recompense. 
T o  me the chief unintelligibility o r  inexplicableness of life 
is its apparent injustice. I cannot admire the love of 
recompense ; but compensation for apparently useless pain 
is another thing, based on pity, or on a feeling of justice. 
It is true that to  bear pain is an heroic achievement and 
may become blessedness, as in Ix ion.  But there is also pain 
so crushing that it leaves no room for the serenity of a 
philosopher-saint like Spinoza. The re  is a physical torture 
of which we can see no use to  the sufferer. 
In  Mihrab Shak Browning tries to  vindicate the exist- 
ence of physical suffering by saying that it produces thank- 
fulness to  God in those who d o  not suffer, which is weak, 
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and also, that it produces pity for  the sufferers. But I am 
glad that this explanation did not always satisfy him, and 
that even his strenuous optimism could not stop the voice 
of his conscience, when he cried in a line of La Saisiax: 
Needs there groan a world in anguish just to teach us sympathy. 
This thought is not in the foreground of his discussion, 
but a t  least, it is there. 
T o  sum up, though there is much that is human and 
heartfelt and vigorously expressed in Browning’s doctrine 
of immortality, there is no reason to  give him especial 
praise for the doctrine laid down in La Saisiax, for it is 
not necessarily the highest morally and it deprives his 
poetry of some noble sources of inspiration. W e  owe to  
it those pathetic cries for reunion with his wife, but the 
mystic moments of which we spoke, and the glimpses of 
the eternal and the infinite which we find in some other 
poets, are rare with Browning. H e  is stopped in his lyr- 
ical flights, his wings being bound by his individualism. H e  
is the captive of it. I t  
also hampers his outlook on the universe, and the expres- 
sion of his pantheistic feeling. 
But this tenacious, paralyzing individualism is relaxed, 
so to  speak, when he touches on two subjects, namely, love 
and the a r t  of music. Love, of which he had such a mar- 
vellous and unique personal experience, the expression of 
which is always both dramatic and lyrical, brings us to  some 
of the summits of his poetry. In  sexual love, he finds the 
revealing power and the same moral virtue which Words- 
worth found in his communion with nature, and which 
others find in asceticism and mysticism. Love means the 
momentary solution of the antinomies of life. I t  is some- 
thing like a sacrament, the blending of soul and matter, 
I t  biases his ideas of immortality. 
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just as a r t  is the blending of idea and form. I t  opens the 
Infinite. 
Oh moment, one and infinite 1191 
Oh, the little more, and how much it is! Joe 
And the little less, and what world8 away! 
A moment after, and hands unseen '8s 
Were  hanging the night around us fast ;  
But we knew that a bar was broken between 
Life and life: we were mixed a t  last 
I n  spite of mortal screen. 
Love is a means of intuitive metaphysical knowledge. 
H e r e  Browning puts new life into Plato by his own expe- 
rience : 
knowledge means 1*4 
Ever-renewed assurance by defeat 
T h a t  victory is somehow still to reach, 
But love is victory, the prize itself. 
Love is 
0' the sole spark of God's life a t  strife115 
With death. 
I t  unbinds the chains of space and time. I t  gives the poet 
.a glimpse of that eternal life which he has somehow failed 
to conceive in his direct discussions on immortality. See 
The Last Ride Together: 
What  if we still ride on, we two 138 
With life for ever old yet new, 
Changed not in kind but in degree, 
T h e  instant made eternity,- 
And heaven just prove that I and she 
Ride, ride together, for ever r ide? 
But love has another value. I t  is the great agency for  the 
growth of our souls, for their mutual fecundation, so well 
explained in Fifine. By it they come to  fruition: 
How the world is made for each of usl1s7 
Tends to some moment's product thus, 
By its fruit, the thing it does! 
How all we perceive and know in i t  
When a soul declares itself-to wit, 
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So, earth has gained by one man the more,J*a 
And the gain of earth must be heaven’s gain too. 
T h e  moment of the revelation of love 
Seems the sole work of a life-time le9 
T h a t  away the rest have trifled. 
I am named and known by that moment’s feat ;  130 
There  took my station and my degree. 
And so we may never, according to  the poet, repel true 
love when it offers, either by procrastination, or by con- 
siderations of prudence, respectability, and the like. I t  
is forfeiting our destinies, making what Dante would call 
the gran rifiuto. Browning does not show, like Corneille, 
conflicts between love and duty, because for him, in most 
cases, love is duty. This is put very boldly in Bifurcation, 
Respectability, and especially in the Statue and the Bust. 
Here  a married lady is actually rebuked by the poet for not: 
saving her soul by leaving her husband and following the 
duke who passes under her windows, 
Empty and fine like a swordless sheath,I3I 
that would have been filled by love. 
I hear you reproach, “But delay was best,‘sS 
For their end was a crime.”-Oh, a crime will do 
As well, I reply, to serve for a test. 
There  is here in Browning a love of vitality, sheer energy, 
Italian virtu which Macchiavelli or Stendahl might envy. 
Browning admits the crime in unfaithfulness to  a despotic 
husband. But he does not call it a sin, the only sin for 
him being that of the people whom Dante places in the 
limbo of his Inferno-want of courage, the sin of 
I like Browning, flinging, in his enthusiasm for love, that 
stone in the face of Victorian respectability. I have a 
mind to cry well done! For there was no real conflict of 
the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin.jSS 
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duties here, or only such a conflict as a law on divorce 
might remove. 
T h e  admirers of Browning, however, were perplexed. 
Professor Her fo rd  tells us that in condemning his lovers 
fo r  wanting energy the poet does not imply approval of 
the crime they failed to  commit. Yet still less does he dis- 
approve of it. T h e  most amusing of Browning’s critics 
and admirers is M r .  Berdoe, author of the Browning 
Cyclopmdia, who feels obliged in conscience to  take excep- 
tion to this passage: “If every woman flew to  the arms 
of the man whom she liked better than her own husband 
and if every governor of a city felt himself a t  liberty to  
steal another man’s wife merely to  complete the circle of 
his own delight [of course it is not a question of delights] 
Society would soon be thrown back into barbarism. T h e  
sacrifice to  conventionality and the self-restraint these 
persons practised may have atoned for much that was de- 
fective in their lives . . . It was a sacrifice justly due to  
human society”. T h e  last point the poet certainly would 
not admit. H e  has already replied that the growth of an 
individual soul is a principle of action and benefits society 
a t  large : 
So, earth has gained by one man the more,fsd 
This passage is further interesting in its bearing on Pro- 
fessor Santayana’s objection that “Browning regards his 
passions as their own excuse for being, and does not domes- 
ticate them, either by understanding their cause o r  by con- 
ceiving their ideal goal”. 
W h a t  we find in Browning is not the defense of passion 
fo r  its own sake, of what Georges Sand (whom Brown- 
ing did not like) and the Romantics called the rights of 
passion, les Droits de  la Passion. Love with him is not 
And the gain of earth must be heaven’s gain too. 
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immoral, irreligious, anti-social. H e  does try to  under- 
stand the cause of his passion which for him is simply 
God, and he does conceive its ideal goal as the develop- 
ment of the soul of man. 
M y  own objection to Browning is a little different. I 
believe that he simply exaggerates the importance of love, 
not absolutely, but in making of it an almost indispensable 
factor in the individual life of man. I am not going to say 
with Bernard Shaw that the idealizing of sex is a false 
idol of romanticism and sentimentalism. But I will not 
admit that only by love, that is to  say by sex, can our souls 
be saved and, this is very nearly the gist of the passage in 
Cristina where the man who speaks, i f  not Browning, has 
a t  least all of Browning’s sympathy : 
Doubt you if, in some such moment,ls6 
Ages past the soul existed, 
And hence fleets again for ages, 
It stops here for  is, this love-way, 
As she fixed me she felt clearly, 
Here an  age ’tis resting merely, 
While the true end, sole and single, 
With some other soul to mingle? 
Else i t  loses what it lived for, 
And eternally must lose i t ;  
Better ends may be in prospect, 
Deeper blisses (if you choose it), 
But this life’s end and this love-bliss 
Have  been lost here. 
I t  would appear from these lines that love is really the 
supreme end of existence and that those who have not met 
with it have missed the aim of their lives. And this is a 
disheartening thing to  say to  many unfortunate persons 
who through no fault of their own have not found that 
blessing, and a hard thing to  say to  so many unmarried 
lady-friends of Browning who did much for him and formed 
the majority in many of the Browning Societies. I t  seems 
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to  me that he does not help them to  live, and that his moral 
teaching, so much admired, is here slightly a t  fault. 
Need I emphasize that the principle “by love are we 
saved” can only be accepted in taking love in a much wider 
sense than Browning takes it here, including all sorts of 
love, religious, ethical, filial, parental, the love of the 
scholar and the artist for their work, or add that between 
these various sorts conflicts may arise? Browning has pro- 
duced in Bifurcation a conflict between love and what the 
lady of the story calls her duty. H e  does not say what 
that duty was, but blames the apparent saint for sacrificing 
her lover who, deprived of love’s guidance, stumbles, falls, 
and becomes morally ruined. But suppose that the lady’s 
duty was her love to  her children, should you blame he r?  
And cannot we imagine other cases where to  renounce love 
may be a higher form of courage than to surrender to i t?  
Such renunciation, as any other sacrifice, may be and is a 
frequent means of the development of soul a t  which Brown- 
ing aims. As  a moralist, he has neglected that point. 
There  is another prejudice in him. Just as he overlooks 
many unhappy persons who have not come across propi- 
tious Eros,  he rather disdains the happier ones who met 
with the god several times. In other words, he shares in 
the romantic superstition of one only love predestined, 
foreordained between two souls, from eternity. In  Any 
Wife to  A n y  Husband, we have the lament of a dying 
wife who foresees that her husband will seek solace with 
other women. H a s  it never occurred to Browning that 
people marry again, and sometimes, let us hope, for love? 
But then i f  you allow this suggestion, Browning perhaps 
foresaw that a second love, given his too definite notions 
about immortality, his hope that the lovers will meet, might 
involve great difficulties in after-life! In spite of these 
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exaggerations, I must repeat that Browning’s partiality 
and even superstition of love, is in itself lovable, a great 
source of lyrical power to  him and an occasional source of 
metaphysical intuition. Love sometimes leads him beyond 
love. I n  Two in the  Campagnu, love itself remains unsatis- 
fied. Here  the poet speaks of 
Infinite passion, and the painj56 
Of finite hearts that yearn, 
which, with the solitude of the Roman Campagna, gives us 
a sense, rare with him, of an immanent being including both 
nature and ourselves. 
Another source of this intuition one finds in Browning’s 
comprehension of music. There  is above all a passage on 
music, in Charles Avison, one of the Parleyings with Cer- 
lain People, which I am astonished not t o  find noticed by 
any of his crjtics, for it contains, perhaps, his profoundest 
and most genuine insight into the nature of the Unknown. 
I t  comes after the statement, 
There  is no truer truth obtainable 157 
By Man than comes of music. 
I t  begins by a distinction between soul and mind. Soul is 
A word which vaguely names what no adept 158 
I n  word-use fits and fixes so that still 
Thing  shall not slip word’s fetter and remain 
Innominate as first, yet, free again, 
Is not less recognized the absolute 
Fact underlying that same other fact 
Concerning which no cavil can dispute 
Our nomenclature when we call it “Mind”- 
Something not Matter-“Soul,’’ who seeks shall find 
Distinct beneath that something. 
Soul is something elusive, which however elusive we recog- 
nize underneath Mind. Mind means our intelligence with 
the help of which our senses build our “solid knowledge”, 
that is, science. But our “solid knowledge” falls short of 
many things. I t  is compared by the poet t o  a bridge 
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of masonry which can over-arch but never grasp or compre- 
hend the gulf underneath, which is soul: 
So works Mind-by stress IS 
Of faculty, with loose facts, more or  less, 
Builds up our  solid knowledge: all the same, 
Underneath rolls what Mind may hide not tame, 
An element which works beyond our guess, 
Soul, the unsounded sea. 
T h e  opposition here drawn between the mind and the over- 
Ilowing stream of soul inaccessible to  it is curiously akin 
to the discrepancy which the French philosopher Bergson 
sees between the essence of life, the vital impulse, 1’e‘lan 
z‘ital, and science, which can only fix, like the cinema, what 
is fluent and moving-interrupt and thereby disfigure, 
what is continuous. 
H o w  shall we  reach the soul, cries the poet, how shall 
we ‘ishoot liquidity into a mould”? 
Soul’s sea,-drawn whence,l@ 
Fed how, forced whither,-by what evidence 
Of ebb and flow, that’s felt beneath the tread, 
Soul has its course ’neath Mind’s work overhead,- 
Who  tells of, tracks to source the founts of Soul? 
Curiously Bergsonian, too, is the idea that where science 
fails, music to  some extent succeeds. Browning applies 
this only to  the life of our soul, the human soul, but it would 
remain true for the soul of life in general. Music accord- 
ing to the poet is superior both to  science and the other 
arts, in that it catches our 
nether-brooding loves, hates, hopes and fears,f4f 
Enwombed past Art’s disclosure. 
Both of them, Music! 
Drag  into day,-by sound, thy master-net,- 
The  abysmal bottom-growth, ambiguous thing 
Unbroken of a branch, palpitating 
With limbs’ play and life’s semblance1 
Outdo 1 0  
Dredging deeper yet, 
W h a t  Browning says of the life of our souls, Bergson 
says still better of life in general and in terms of his own 
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philosophy. Music carries us into the heart of things, the 
core of change, in what he calls pure duration. Dwelling 
on the idea of mobility which Browning rendered by the 
image of the stream under the bridge: “Ecoutons une 
mClodie”, says Bergson, “en nous laissant bercer par elle: 
n’avons nous pas la perception nette d’un mouvement qui 
n’est attach6 i aucun mobile, d’un changement sans rien 
qui change? Le  changement se suffit, il est la chose 
mihe” .  Le t  us listen to a melody and let ourselves be 
rocked by i t ;  have we not a clear perception of a move- 
ment independent of any moving object, of a change with- 
out a thing that changes? T h e  change is sufficient in itself, 
it is the thing itself. 
Browning’s philosophy of Music is also akin to  that of 
Schopenhauer who said that the world was only music 
realized. After looking into the philosophy of Charles 
Avison we are able to understand more fully his other 
poems on music, such as Abt Yogler, with its deep word 
that is, we musicians alone penetrate into the inmost 
secrets of life; and with its magnificent vision of the organ- 
ist who builds his palace of Music, rising to  heaven while 
heaven seems to descend on earth, 
’tis we musicians know,‘@ 
Not a point nor peak but found and fixed its wandering s tar ;  IU 
For earth had attained to heaven, there was no more near nor far. 
He re  again we have the sense of the One, Infinite and 
Absolute. 
T o  conclude, though Browning’s individualism was to  
his poetry a great source of force and beauty, yet his 
highest flights occur when he allows this individualism to  
be for a moment immerged in the contemplation of the 
infinite sea that surrounds his insulated ego. And these 
e . . . . . . . . .  
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moments occur chiefly in his poems on love and on music. 
It will be more fair, however, and more in accord with 
Browning’s inmost wishes if  we choose our supreme example 
and our final quotation from his own personal religion, 
his religion of moral development. For  though I have 
dwelt much on his art ,  and have not admired everything 
in his morals, his ar t  does not suffer from the fact that  he 
does help us to  live, H e  does so, not by direct teaching, 
but by the lyrical contagion of his faith in life, for  instance, 
in those .famous stanzas of Rabbi Ben Ezra where moral 
enthusiasm carries him into an ecstasjv, a sort of lyric dance, 
which may be compared to  the dance of Zarathustra in 
Nietzsche : 
He fixed thee mid this dance16 
Of plastic circumstance, 
Machinery just meant 
To  give thy soul its bent, 
This Present, thou, forsooth, wouldst fain arrest: 
Try thee and turn thee forth, sufficiently impressed. 
The  beauty of such a poem, intensely characteristic of 
Browning, is in the combination of his realistic, precise 
and concrete imagination with a sublime moral exaltation, 
each supporting the other and producing a quality never 
felt before. W e  see the clay, the potter, the straps of the 
potter’s wheel 
What though the earlier grooves 
Which ran the laughing loves 
Around thy base, no longer pause and press? 
W e  see these grooves pressing on a clay cup, and yet we 
see heaven. And I venture to say that  the chief beauty is 
that  the cup, that  is Browning, i f  you like, does for  once 
not think of itself, biit, with a more complete surrender 
than is usual, thinks only of its highest use, namely, to  
slake the thirst of God. 
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Look not thou down but up ! ‘47 
To uses of a cup, 
The new wine’s foaming flow, 
The  Master’s lips aglow ! 
The  festal board, lamp’s flash and trumpet’s peal, 
Thou, heaven’s consummate cup, what need’st thou with 
earth’s wheel? 
I t  is in such poems that Browning appears a t  his best, by 
such poems that he will be remembered as a poet so familiar 
and yet so sublime, so original in form and matter, in 
sound, rhythm, and image, that it becomes irrelevant to  
compare him with others, t o  decide whether he is greater 
than they, for it is enough to  declare that he is unique. 
I shall spare you, therefore, the worn out parallel be- 
tween Browning and his great contemporary and rival, but 
I wish to  say that to  us, French-speaking people, Browning 
is, or ought to  be, of more interest and value than Tenny- 
son. For  he is not narrowly insular as is the latter; he is 
a citizen of all nations, past and present, of Germany, 
France, or Italy;  he has, of course, a much more powerful 
mind. And finally, whereas Tennyson’s qualities are not 
uncommon with us, Browning, owing to  an originality 
amounting to genius, is, even as an artist, full of sugges- 
tions and has infinitely more to  give us, if only we would 
read him. But, in spite of what M. Maeterlinck says, 
he is not read with us. T o  be read, he wants an  inter- 
preter, and such a n  interpreter I am trying to  be. I t  has, 
I trust, been worth your while to  know that something 
was being done for Browning abroad, and in what spirit 
it was being done, 
PAUL DE REUL. 
